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BOOK REVIEWS 
The Openness of God, by Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, 
William Hasker, and David Basinger. Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1994. Pp. 202. 
EDWARD WIERENGA, University of Rochester 
The five authors of this book each contribute a chapter in defense of 
what they call the "openness of God". They aim to present this view to 
a broader audience "beyond the confines of professional theologians 
and philosophers" (9). Accordingly, they give less attention to detail 
and to developed argument than one would expect in a volume 
addressed primarily to philosophers. Thus, for example, the view in 
question is summarized simply as: "God grants humans significant 
freedom to cooperate with or work against God's will for their lives, and 
he enters into dynamic, give-and-take relationships with us" (7). Behind 
this simple formulation, however, lies a complex web of theological and 
philosophical claims. First, the authors deny that God has the tradition-
al attributes of simplicity, impassibility, immutability, and eternality. 
Second, they hold that God is omniscient, but only in an attenuated 
sense. In particular, God's knowledge of the future extends only to 
what is causally determined by present conditions and to what God 
knows that he himself will do: God does not have foreknowledge of 
what free agents other than he will do. And divine omniscience does 
not include middle knowledge or knowledge of what free creatures 
would do in various alternative circumstances. Third, God has created 
human beings with libertarian free will, and he has a "commitment to 
the welfare of his creatures" and a "profound sensitivity to their experi-
ences" (58), but he does not ordinarily "override" their freedom (156). 
Put thus starkly, these theses sound like ones that have been 
endorsed by many other writers. The authors of this volume, however, 
are prepared to embrace such particulars as that God is surprised by 
what happens (94), that creatures can have an effect on God (22), and that 
he comes to regret those of his actions that turn out to be mistaken or 
wrong (27, 117). Having made this departure from the traditional view 
of God, they are forced to make adjustments in other areas of theology. 
Thus they hold that election is "a summons to service, not a guarantee of 
salvation" (57), that all prophecy regarding future free acts of creatures, 
including Jesus' prophecy of Peter's denial (Matt 26:34), is conditional (55, 
153)\ that since things can turn out differently than God envisioned, fol-
lowing God's will can turn out badly (165), and that God permits evil to 
happen to us even though it is not required either for bringing about a 
greater good or for avoiding a worse evil (152). 
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In Chapter I, in contrast to the traditional view of God, which "empha-
sizes God's sovereignty, majesty, and glory" (11), Richard Rice attempts to 
marshall biblical evidence for "an interactive view of God's relation to the 
world [according to which] what happens [in the world] affects God 
somehow-by evoking a certain emotion, a change in attitude, a change in 
plans" (18). Among Old Testament passages, Rice give particular promi-
nence to texts that describe God as repenting, for example, "The LORD was 
sorry that he had made humankind on the earth, and it grieved him to his 
heart" (Gen. 6:6 NRSV), and "The LORD was sorry that he had made Saul 
king over Israel" (1 Sam. 15:35). In the New Testament Rice draws conclu-
sions about the nature of God from the life and ministry of Jesus, justify-
ing this move, in part, by claiming that "the fact that God chose to express 
himself through the medium of a human life suggests that God's experi-
ence has something in common with certain aspects of human experi-
ence" (39). (Rice does not say what may be deduced about the nature of 
God's experience from the obvious, parallel reasoning that God also chose 
to express himself through the written word.) 
In Chapter 2 John Sanders asks how the "prima facie meaning of the 
texts cited in favor of the openness of God is commonly overturned in 
favor of another interpretation" (59). His answer is that Christian theol-
ogy was Hellenized. To support this interpretation, Sanders first gives a 
brief summary of Greek philosophy and of Philo of Alexandria, and 
then he presents a history of Christian theology. The latter runs from 
the fathers through Augustine, pauses briefly for the Middle Ages and 
the Reformation, and then leaps to the twentieth century. Sanders 
protests that, throughout this history, theologians, under the influence of 
Greek ideas of divinity, resisted interpreting the Bible in a straightfor-
ward way, that, for example, "biblical texts that suggest that God 
changed his mind, was surprised by human action[,] or suffered are 
explained as anthropomorphisms" (94); the resulting theology Sanders 
describes as "the biblical-classical synthesis." 
Clark Pinnock takes up, in Chapter 3, the task of proposing "a more 
biblical and coherent doctrine of God" (101). Like Sanders he deplores 
the "excessive Hellenization" of traditional theology, and like Rice he 
takes the Bible to teach that God reacts to the world and changes his 
plans, that, for example, "when God saw the extent of human wicked-
ness on the earth, he was sorry that he had made humankind" (117). 
Occasionally Pinnock seems especially extravagant, as when, for exam-
ple, he says that "to speak more of God's power than of weakness ... [is] a 
theological distortion" (105) or when he says that according to social 
trinitarianism (which he accepts) "God is the perfection of love and com-
munion, the very antithesis of self-sufficiency [emphasis added]" (108). 
In Chapter 4 William Hasker, as befits a regular contributor to this 
journal, offers a philosophical defense of the open view of God. Hasker 
delineates five theories about God's knowledge of and relation to the 
world: theological determinism (which he unfortunately calls 
"Calvinism"2), Molinism (the doctrine that God has middle knowledge), 
the theory of simple foreknowledge, the open view, and process theolo-
gy. Hasker argues that the open view is superior to the others on this 
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list. In particular, he claims that the open view provides the best 
account of our relationship with God and the best response to the prob-
lem of evil. I shall discuss these contentions below. 
In the final chapter David Basinger draws out applications of the 
open view for petitionary prayer, divine guidance, human suffering, and 
social and evangelistic responsibility. 
In the space that remains I want to comment critically on some of the 
issues William Hasker raises. To a considerable extent Hasker's reasons 
in favor of the open view depend upon positions he has written about 
extensively elsewhere, in particular, his insistence that divine fore-
knowledge is incompatible with human free action and his contention 
that God does not have middle knowledge.3 I think that these positions 
have been adequately disputed elsewhere,4 and so I will not address 
them here. Instead, I will focus on two advantages Hasker claims for the 
open view against its leading competitors. First, Hasker maintains that 
the open view provides for an "appealing" or "attractive" conception of 
"our personal relationship with God" (150-1). Hasker claims that theo-
logical determinism, in contrast, makes the relation between God and 
people like that of "a puppet-master controlling a puppet, or a ventrilo-
quist having a 'conversation' with his dummy" (142), which evidently 
does not make for a meaningful relationship. Molinism does not fare 
much better. Here God is an "archmanipulator," like a "cyberneticist" 
who completely understands his robot's program, even if he did not 
write all of the code (145-146). 
Let us focus on just the comparison with Molinism. Hasker apparent-
ly thinks that if I realize that God has taken into account his knowledge 
of how I would react in various circumstances in planning which situa-
tions in which to place me-all with the aim of drawing me closer to 
him as well as furthering his plan for others-I may reasonably feel 
manipulated, a feeling which will damage my relationship with God. I 
will question in a moment whether this is an appropriate response. If it 
is, however, the open view seems no better. On this view, God has 
taken into account his knowledge of how I am likely to react in various 
circumstances in planning what situations to place me in-and he has at 
his disposal vast knowledge and power-again with the aim of drawing 
me close to him as well as furthering his plan for others. If feeling 
manipulated was appropriate in the first instance, it would seem to be 
equally appropriate in this case. In fact, on the open view, why should I 
not feel not only manipulated but placed at risk, since on the open view 
God does not know that his action will turn out well? And if I think that 
God is not only manipulating me but taking chances with me, as well, 
that is no less likely to interfere with my relationship with him. So the 
open view does not seem to be an improvement, on this score, over the 
Molinist alternative. 
I should add, however, that I do not really think that feeling manipu-
lated is the appropriate reaction to God's providence. When I reflect on 
God's goodness and care for me, lI[glratitude of mind for the favorable 
outcome of things, patience in adversity, and also incredible freedom 
from worry about the future will necessarily follow upon this know 1-
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edge."s The phrase is Calvin's, who adds that "[c]ertainty about God's 
providence puts joyous trust toward God in our hearts."6 An attitude of 
gratitude, joyous trust, and, we could add, willing obedience, would 
seem to permit a pretty good relationship with God. If it is not unrea-
sonable for an adherent of a robust doctrine of providence to adopt it, 
then such a view needs no improvement on this count. 
Hasker also claims that the open view is superior to its rivals in its 
capacity to deal with the problem of evil. According to the open view 
God knows that evils will occur, but he has not for the most part 
decreed or incorporated into his plan the individual instances of 
evil. Rather, God governs the world according to general strate-
gies, strategies which are, as a whole, ordered for the good of the 
creation, but whose detailed consequences are not foreseen or 
intended by God prior to the decision to adopt them. As a result 
of this, we are able to ... admit the presence in the world of partic-
ular evils God's permission of which is not the means of bring-
ing about any greater good or preventing any equal or greater 
evil. (152) 
No doubt the problem of evil is a serious problem for every version of 
theism. And Christians of any persuasion will be hard-pressed to say, 
for every particular example of evil, what greater good required it. Of 
course, Christians who hold to a robust doctrine of providence are likely 
to say that God has his reasons, even if we are not in a position to know 
what they are. But Hasker apparently prefers to resort not to agnosti-
cism about the justification of evil but to say rather that there are evils 
which do not serve any good purpose, which are not required by any 
greater good, but which occurred either because God did not anticipate 
them or because in his focus on "general strategies" he did not concern 
himself with them. 
I fail to see how the open view is an improvement over its competi-
tors on this point, either. In the first place, since God, on this view, "has 
a vast amount of knowledge about the probabilities that free choices will 
be made in one way rather than another" (151) and he has a similarly 
vast knowledge of the workings of the universe, God was certainly in a 
position, with respect to many of the evils that have in fact occurred, to 
predict that they would occur. Indeed, it seems reasonable to think that, 
on the open view, God would have been justified in believing with respect 
to many such evils that they would occur, unless he intervened, even if 
he did not know this with certainty. Furthermore, on this view God can 
know what people are thinking and intending in the present. Thus 
when he sees people with evil hearts and murderous intentions load 
thousands of pounds of homemade explosives into a rented truck, God 
is in a good position to predict that, unless he intervenes, tragedy will 
ensue. Why would he fail to intervene, unless he could foresee that the 
evil likely to ensue was required for a greater good?7 But this is precise-
ly something that on the open view God is unable to foresee. So the open 
view faces the same problem Hasker claims to beset traditional 
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Christianity but with the disadvantage that on this view God is less like-
ly to be justified in permitting evil. In other words, the open view faces 
the same difficulties as traditional Christianity but with fewer resources 
to meet them. That does not strike me as an advantage. 
Despite the laudable concern these authors have for developing a 
position that is both biblically sound and adequate for a rich religious 
life, the view they present, as I have tried to make explicit, is not only a 
radical departure from traditional Christianity but it is a departure not 
justified by the reasons they cite in its favor. 
NOTES 
1. One of the authors, William Hasker, in God, Time, and Knowledge 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989) interprets this prophecy 
not as conditional but as a prediction "based on foresight drawn from exist-
ing trends and tendencies" (p. 194). Under either interpretation it is possible 
for the prophecy to be made but to be unfulfilled, either because the relevant 
condition-whatever it is-is unsatisfied or because the current trends are 
reversed or overridden. 
2. J.T. McNeil's The History and Character of Calvinism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1954) is not primarily a history of the doctrine of 
theological determinism! 
3. See his God, Time and Knowledge and "A Refutation of Middle 
Knowledge," Nous 20 (1986): 545-57. 
4. See Thomas P. Flint, "Hasker's God, Time, and Freedom," Philosophical 
Studies 60 (1990): 103-115 and "In Defense of Theological Compatibilism," 
Faith and Philosophy 8 (1991): 237-243, as well as Alfred J. Freddoso, "Review 





Calvin, Institutes, I, xvii, 7. 
Ibid. I, xvii, 11. 
A similar claim may be made about the evils Hasker cites on p. 146. 
The Sources of Christian Ethics, by Servais Pinckaers OP. Washington 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995. Pp. xxi and 489. 
$24.95. 
JAMES G. HANINK, Loyola Marymount University. 
"It is difficult," Pinckaers notes, "to describe a situation while living in 
the midst of all its complexity ... " (304) It's perhaps equally hard to iden-
tify a classic within a decade of its writing and a year of its translation 
for Anglophone readers. Still, Pinckaers's Sources is a contender. 
The author, a Belgian, teaches theology at the University of Fribourg. 
Sources appeared as Les sources de la morale chretienne in 1985, and 
Pinckaers tells us he wrote it for a broad audience. His text is straight-
forward and ambitious. Pinckaers first defines Christian ethics and then 
examines its relation to the behavioral sciences, to Scripture, and to the 
